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Recent Decisions
CIVIL RIGHTS-TITLE VII- 42 U.S.C. § 1981-DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT-APPLICABILITY TO WHITES-The United States Su-
preme Court has held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
bars racial discrimination against white persons in private employ-
ment upon the same standards as nonwhites and that section 1981
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provides a federal remedy against
private discrimination in employment against whites as well as non-
whites.
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273
(1976).
In 1970, petitioners L.N. McDonald and Raymond L. Laird, both
white, and Charles Jackson, a black, all employees of Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Company (Santa Fe), were jointly and severally
charged with misappropriating cargo from one of Santa Fe's ship-
ments. Petitioners were subsequently fired by Santa Fe, but the
black employee was retained.' After receiving no redress through
their union's grievance procedures, the petitioners filed complaints
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
charging that the respondents violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 by discharging them because of their race. The EEOC
1. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as
amended by The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to. 2000e-
15 (Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter referred to as Title VII or the Act], declares it unlawful for
an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
§ 2000e-2(a).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is charged with the administra-
tion of the Act. Id. § 2000e-4(a). An aggrieved individual may file charges with the EEOC or
a member of the Commission may file the charges. If the EEOC determines there is no
reasonable cause to believe the charge is true, it can dismiss the complaint. If reasonable
cause is found, the Commission must "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id.
§ 2000e-5(a), (b). For a general discussion of EEOC procedures see Sape & Hart, Title VII
Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WAsH. L. Rxv. 824
(1972); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1195-1275 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments].
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dismissed the complaint for lack of reasonable cause, whereupon the
petitioners filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas.3 The suit alleged discrimination on ac-
count of race in violation of section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
18661 as well as Title VII The district court dismissed petitioners'
section 1981 claims for want of jurisdiction, asserting that section
1981 confers no actionable rights on white persons.' On the Title VII
issue, the court held that white petitioners dismissed after being
charged with theft of company property had not stated a claim upon
which Title VII relief could be granted, even though the company
retained a black employee charged with the same wrong.7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of both claims.8 It noted that the lan-
guage of section 1981 gives all persons equal benefit of the laws as
is enjoyed by white persons, but without elaboration, agreed with
the district court that the statute confers no actionable rights on
white persons.9 The Title VII claim was also dismissed since there
was no allegation that petitioners were falsely charged with the
crime.10
In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court
reversed." Initially, the Court dealt with whether whites who allege
3. 427 U.S. at 275. See note 6 infra. If the conciliation efforts of the EEOC are unavailing,
the EEOC may file a civil action in federal district court against an employer or union. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). If the charge filed with the EEOC is dismissed, as was the case in
McDonald, the Commission must notify the persons aggrieved that a civil action in federal
district court may be brought against the employer and union. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
4. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1970), reads in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and all proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
Id. § 1981.
5. The joining of Title VII and § 1981 claims in cases involving employment discrimina-
tion is fairly common. See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) (suit alleging that civil service test given to
Boston firefighters had racially discriminatory impact).
6. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., No. 71-891 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 1974).
7. See 427 U.S. at 278.
8. 513 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
9. Id. at 90. See note 4 supra for the text of § 1981.
10. 513 F.2d at 90.
11. 427 U.S. at 278. The vote was unanimous on the Title VII issue. Justice White and
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's view that § 1981 reached discrimination in the
private sector. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text infra.
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discrimination in private employment could obtain relief under
Title VII. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 2 which enunciated the basic
objectives of Title VII, had stated that the Act prohibits discrimina-
tory preferences for any racial group, white or nonwhite. 3 After
briefly noting that the EEOC has held the provisions of Title VII
applicable to whites, 4 and that the Act's legislative history clearly
reveals an intent to bar all discrimination in private employment, 5
the Court concluded that Title VII is applicable to whites "upon the
same standards" as nonwhites."i The Court did emphasize, how-
ever, that its decision did not consider the permissibility of affirma-
tive action programs, 7 since Santa Fe had not claimed that its
actions were part of such a program. 8
Justice Marshall rejected Santa Fe's contention that since peti-
tioners were charged with a serious criminal offense, it had a legiti-
mate right to dismiss them from their jobs. 9 The essence of a Title
VII claim is whether race is the "but for" cause of the discharge.2
Santa Fe's dismissal of only its white employees was arguably ra-
cially motivated; accordingly, petitioners had adequately stated a
12. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (standardized tests which disproportionately exclude blacks and
are not related to job performance violate Title VII).
13. In Griggs, the Supreme Court described Title VII as prohibiting "[d]iscriminatory
preference for any [racial] group, minority or majority. ... Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
14. 427 U.S. at 280 n.7.
15. Id. at 280. The legislative remarks cited by the Court reveal that Title VII was in-
tended to "cover all white men and white women and all Americans." 110 CONG. RIc. 2579
(1969) (remarks of Representative Celler).
16. 427 U.S. at 280.
17. Affirmative action programs seek to achieve equal opportunity in employment. They
require that positive steps be taken to remedy the effects of past discrimination; such pro-
grams do more than merely require that future discriminatory conduct cease. See generally
Developments, supra note 2, at 1242, 1291-1304.
18. In a carefully worded footnote the Court stated: "Santa Fe disclaims that the actions
challenged here were any part of an affirmative action program, . . . and we emphasize that
we do not consider here the permissibility of such a program, whether judicially required or
otherwise prompted." 427 U.S. at 280-81 n.8.
19. Id. at 281-85.
20. Id. at 282. The "but for" test was first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). The McDonald Court found McDonnell Douglas indistin-
guishable. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that a prima facie Title VII case is estab-
lished when a petitioner shows that: (1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied and
was qualified for an open job; (3) he was rejected; and (4) after the rejection, the employer
continued to seek applicants with similar qualifications. Id. at 802. Once a petitioner demon-
strates that these circumstances exist, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to establish
some legitimate reason for the rejection or dismissal. The petitioner is then given the oppor-
tunity to show that the employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.
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Title VII claim. 21
The majority also disagreed with the lower courts' position that
section 1981 confers no actionable rights on white persons. Citing
the Court's previous holdings that section 1981 affords a federal
remedy against racial discrimination in private employment,2 2 Jus-
tice Marshall framed the issue as whether that same remedy was
available to whites alleging such discrimination. 2 Since the lan-
guage of section 1981 provides that it be applicable to "all per-
sons, ' 24 the Court reasoned that the phrase "as is enjoyed by white
citizens" merely emphasized the racial character of the rights being
protected 25 and in no way limited the statute's applicability to black
complainants; the Act prohibited discrimination in private employ-
ment regardless of the race of the aggrieved person.25 An examina-
tion of section 1981's legislative history revealed that the impetus
of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts was to provide relief for
freed slaves; however, nothing in the legislative debates suggested
21. 427 U.S. at 285. Since the district court had dismissed petitioners' claims on the
pleadings, the Court remanded the case for an assessment of the merits of the claim. Id. at
296.
22. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Jones is the leading case on
the availability of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts, including § 1981, as a federal remedy
for discrimination in private employment. The case involved an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1970), which gives all citizens the same right "as is enjoyed by white citizens" to
"inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." Jones held that
§ 1982 prohibits racial discrimination by private individuals in the purchase and sale of real
property. 392 U.S. at 413. Although McDonald involved § 1981 rather than § 1982, the two
sections are part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Supreme Court has indicated that
they should be interpreted and applied in a similar manner. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 169 (1976).
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Court noted that
although it had not specifically held that § 1981 provides a federal remedy against private
racial discrimination in employment, the issue was settled in the federal courts of appeals
and "we now join them." Id. at 459. See note 49 infra for further commentary on Johnson.
23. 427 U.S. at 285.
24. See note 4 supra for the text of § 1981.
25. 427 U.S. at 287. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791-92 (1966).
26. 427 U.S. at 287. Section 1981 has been expressly limited to claims of racial discrimina-
tion and thus provides no relief for sex, age, religious, or other forms of discrimination. See,
e.g., Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (discrimination based
solely on sex not actionable under § 1981); Veres v. County of Monroe, 364 F. Supp. 1327
(E.D. Mich. 1973) (§ 1981 claim based on alleged illegal commitment dismissed because
phrase "as is enjoyed by white citizens" indicates that statute only applies to racial discrimi-
nation). Employment discrimination against aliens has been held to be actionable under §
1981. See Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
27. The present § 1981 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See
427 U.S. at 286.
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that the statute was limited to that goal.28 Justice Marshall con-
cluded, therefore, that section 1981 bars discrimination in private
employment against whites as well as nonwhites."'
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion.2 He disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that section 1981 could be used to combat
private discrimination, arguing that the civil rights statute does not
provide a federal remedy for discrimination outside the public sec-
tor, be it directed toward whites or nonwhites. 1 The Court's pre-
vious decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,3" holding that sec-
tion 1982 bars discrimination by private individuals in the sale or
rental of real property, was not controlling since the two sections
derived their authority from different constitutional amendments.33
The Supreme Court's decision in McDonald resolves the apparent
conflict in the lower courts regarding Title VII's applicability to
white complainants 34 as well as the dispute over whether whites
could avail themselves of section 1981 as a remedy for discrimina-
tion in private employment. Since the EEOC, which administers
28. 427 U.S. at 287-96. See generally Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1974); Gressman, The Unhappy History
of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. Rav. 1323 (1952).
29. 427 U.S. at 296.
30. Justice White's dissent in McDonald is based on the reasons articulated in his opinion
in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 192-214 (1976) (dissenting opinion). See note 33 infra.
31. Id. at 192 (dissenting opinion).
32. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See note 22 supra.
33. 427 U.S. at 213 (dissenting opinion). In Justice White's view, § 1982 derives from the
thirteenth amendment under which Congress may reach private conduct, whereas § 1981
derives from the fourteenth amendment under which Congress may only reach state action.
Id. at 213 (dissenting opinion). Lower courts have consistently applied these statutes in a
parallel manner, however, and the Supreme Court has countenanced this view. See note 22
supra. See generally Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justifica-
tion for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1024 (1972).
34. See Mele v. United States Dep't of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592 (D.N.J. 1975) (white
plaintiff is not a member of the class of persons protected by Title VII and therefore may not
invoke protections of EEOC guidelines on standardized tests); Haber v. Klassen, 10 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1446 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (only racial minorities may obtain relief
under Title VII). See 14 DUQ. L. REv. 269 (1976), where the author questions the correctness
of the holdings in Mele and Haber.
The Haber decision was based in part on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). Although there was some indication in McDonnell Douglas that only minorities were
entitled to Title VII's protections, see note 20 supra, Justice Powell stated unequivocally in
his McDonnell Douglas opinion that "Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise." 411 U.S. at 801.
35. Compare Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975) (white
student excluded from summer internship program because of his race could bring suit under
1977
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Title VII, had held that the Act bars all racial discrimination,"6 and
the legislative history strongly supports the position that Title VII
was intended to be a color-blind statute, 7 the Court's holding re-
garding Title VII was arguably not a difficult one.
The question of the breadth of section 1981 presented a more
difficult problem for the Court. Since the Court's decision in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 3 in 1968, section 1981 has been held to
provide a federal remedy for private racial discrimination in em-
ployment. 39 The lower courts were split, however, over whether the
statute afforded whites the same relief.40 The confusion was com-
pounded by section 1981 claims brought by whites who were not
claiming they had been discriminated against because of their race,
but rather that their employer was discriminating against them on
account of their efforts to vindicate the civil rights of black employ-
ees." The dismissal of these claims, which could have been inter-
preted as denying the Act's protections to whites, merely affirmed
the view that a complainant may seek relief under section 1981 only
when he has faced discrimination because of his race. 2 Although
§ 1981), and WRMA Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Ala. 1973)
(white broadcaster allegedly fired because of his race could bring suit under § 1981), with
Ripp v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (white discharged due to his
association with black employees could not bring suit under § 1981 since that statute does
not protect whites), and Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md.), aff'd, 285 F.2d 426
(4th Cir. 1960) (white plaintiff has no remedy under § 1981).
36. See, e.g., Decision 74-94, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 701 (EEOC 1974) (white
professor at black university allegedly fired due to his race could use Title VII's protections);
Decision 74-31, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1326, 1328 (EEOC 1973) ("the employment
opportunities of any group [are] protected by Title VII, including Caucasions"). For a
discussion of Title VII's color-blindness objective see Developments, supra note 2, at 1113-
19.
37. See note 15 supra.
38. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See note 22 supra.
39. See, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974); Young v. International
Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
40. See note 35 supra.
41. See, e.g., Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (white
male denied advancements and salary increases due to his attempts to change hiring policies
toward minorities could not bring suit under § 1981 since retaliatory measures were not based
on race, but rather his attempts to change company policy); NOW v. Bank of California, 5
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8510 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (suit under § 1981 brought by white
allegedly fired when he sought to change employer's discriminatory practices dismissed since
firing was not based on petitioner's race).
42. See note 41 supra. Cf. Foust v. Transamerica Corp., 391 F. Supp. 312, 315 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (standing under Title VII restricted to those who are the objects of the prohibited
discrimination); Elk Grove Firefighters Local 2340 v. Willis, 391 F. Supp. 487, 488 (N.D. Ill.
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section 1981 on its face prohibits discrimination against "all per-
sons,"43 its language giving every individual the same rights "as
[are] enjoyed by white citizens" has also engendered confusion.
Some courts have construed that phrase as negating 1981's broader
language and evincing a congressional intent to make the Act avail-
able only to blacks facing racial discrimination." Section 1981's
historical setting arguably offers some support for that view. The
Act's legislative history is admittedly inconclusive, but it would
seem that the thrust of the legislation was a desire to preserve the
newly accorded rights of freed blacks. 5
McDonald's construction of section 1981 nevertheless would ap-
pear to be the better view." Its emphasis on the Act's broader im-
1975) (one has no standing to sue for the deprivation of another's civil rights).
43. See note 4 supra for the text of § 1981.
44. See Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98 (D. Md.), aff'd, 285 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1960)
(employing this reasoning).
45. The McDonald Court quoted several excerpts from the nearly one hundred pages of
debate on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, from which § 1981 derives. Among these was a
statement by Senator Trumbull of Illinois, a leading sponsor of the bill, in which he described
the Act as a "[bill to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights .... "
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866). Justice Marshall also referred to Representa-
tive Wilson's remarks that the purpose of the measure was to provide "for the equality of
citizens . . . in the enjoyment of their civil rights and immunities." Id. at 1117.
Those who argue that § 1981 was not intended to apply to whites cite remarks from Senator
Guthrie, who stated that the bill "enforces prosecution of the citizens who... commit what
they suppose is an infraction of it, in favor of the black population and the black population
only." Id. at 601.
Although not raised by the respondents in McDonald, it might also be argued that Congress
lacked the power under the thirteenth amendment, which § 1981 was enacted to implement,
to pass protective legislation for whites, since the thirteenth amendment was enacted in
response to the institution of slavery. However, the courts that have dealt directly with this
issue have rejected this proposition. See WRMA Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp.
577, 581 (M.D. Ala. 1973): "[Ilt is entirely consonant with the purpose of Section 1981 that
whites discriminated against for racial reasons should have standing under Section 1981, and
the power of Congress so to provide is a power ancillary to the enabling clause of the Thir-
teenth Amendment." Cf. Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (thirteenth
amendment freedom from involuntary servitude not based on individual's race, but on
whether the individual "suffered from the wrong the amendment was created to cure").
46. See generally Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REv. 1, 16 (1974) ("the rights possessed by white citizens . ..
became the yardstick for measuring the rights possessed by all citizens"). See also Larson,
The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 470, 488. The author notes the inherent
faults in using legislative history from the 19th century to justify modern interpretations of
the civil rights statutes. He discussed the Court's analysis of legislative history in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See note 22 supra. Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, supplied seven pages of legislative history to support the Court's view that Congress
intended § 1982 to reach private racial discrimination. Justice Harlan, in dissent, countered
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port, proscribing racial discrimination against all persons, supports
the proposition that Congress intends to treat all citizens equally
when it passes anti-discrimination legislation. Even if the Act was
originally intended to only benefit emancipated blacks, the Su-
preme Court may have believed that to ascribe a color-conscious
label to an equal rights statute would have been inherently repug-
nant to the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
In any event, to construe a statute which demands that all persons
be treated equally, in a manner that excludes from the Act's protec-
tion a majority of the nation's citizens would have been a somewhat
anomalous, if not incongruous, exercise in statutory interpretation.
Although McDonald settled the issue of whether whites may
statutorily challenge discriminatory employment practices, its
holding that both Title VII and section 1981 are available as federal
remedies against such practices raises serious questions concerning
the relationship between the two federal statutes.47 Although Title
VII was hailed as the first effort by the federal government to out-
law private discrimination,"' the Supreme Court approved the use
of section 1981 as a separate and distinct remedy against private
racial discrimination in employment in Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc." While there are similarities in the types of relief af-
fordable under the two statutes,50 Title VII and section 1981 have
distinct differences as well. Title VII not only bars racial discrimina-
with thirteen pages of legislative history, arguing for a contrary result. Professor Larson
concluded that "[alny attempt to fix the content of a hundred-year-old statute by samplings
of what individual congressmen said is both improper and impossible." Id. at 488.
47. See generally Comment, Selecting a Remedy for Private Racial Discrimination: Stat-
utes in Search of Scope, 4 Foimwiw Uiw. L.J. 303 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Selecting a
Remedy].
48. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTraINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 8 (1966).
49. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). In Johnson, the plaintiff filed with the EEOC a timely charge of
employment discrimination under Title VII. The plaintiff argued that this filing tolled the
statute of limitations for a § 1981 cause of action arising from the same facts. The Supreme
Court disagreed. It reasoned that the statutes provide separate, distinct, and coextensive
remedies for discrimination in employment and thus the filing of a claim under one statute
does not toll the statute of limitations on the other. Id. at 466.
50. For example, Title VII authorizes affirmative relief, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), and
such relief has been awarded in § 1981 cases, including the imposition of hiring quotas. See,
e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). The
burden of proof in Title VII and § 1981 cases is also similar. See Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496
F.2d 500, 505 n.ll (6th Cir. 1974) (the principles of McDonnell Douglas, the leading Title VII




tion, but also discrimination. on the basis of religion, sex, and na-
tional origin.5 ' Title VII, however, covers only employers with fifteen
or more employees, '5 whereas section 1981 can be asserted against
any employer. Title VII also has various procedural requirements
prerequisite to filing a claim in federal court-procedural require-
ments that do not attend section 1981. 51 Although back pay relief
has been granted under both statutes,54 back pay awards under Title
VII are expressly limited by statute to two years.55 Furthermore, the
district courts have been hesitant to award compensatory or puni-
tive damages under Title VII,56 yet such relief seems to be available
under section 1981. 57
Due to the advantages section 1981 may offer, litigants might
make use of that Act to obtain relief rather than resorting to the
administrative machinery established under Title VII. This would
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
52. Id. § 2000e(b).
53. See notes 2 & 3 supra. If a charge with the EEOC is dismissed as in McDonald, the
EEOC notifies the plaintiff who then has 90 days to file a civil action in federal district court.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970). In essence, this 90-day period serves as a statute of limita-
tions for the filing of a suit under Title VII. Section 1981 has no such limitation period; its
timeliness is determined by the limitations period of a comparable state action. See Young
v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 763 (3d Cir. 1971).
54. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discussing in detail the
appropriateness of back pay relief under Title VII); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach.
Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972) (back pay relief granted to
employee under § 1981).
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
56. See, e.g., Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1341-42 (D. Hawaii 1974) (defendant's
motion to dismiss plaintiff's demand for compensatory damages granted since Title VII
makes it clear only equitable relief can be granted). But cf. Humphrey v. Southwestern
Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832, 843 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d
691 (5th Cir. 1974) (where plaintiff was disabled and unavailable for work, court could fashion
equitable relief in form of compensatory damages).
57. See, e.g., Cofield v. Goldman, Sachs, & Co., 364 F. Supp. 1372, 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(plaintiff entitled to any compensatory and punitive damages he is able to show under §
1981). Title VII does offer litigants some definite advantages. The Act authorizes a federal
district court to appoint counsel and pay attorneys fees and costs under certain circumstan-
ces. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). The Supreme Court recently has refused to permit
an award of attorneys fees in federal litigation unless a federal statute specifically provides
for awards of such fees. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263
(1975). However, Congress has since authorized district courts to award attorneys fees to
successful litigants under the civil rights acts, including § 1981. See Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559,90 Stat. 2641, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970).
The EEOC or the attorney general (in cases involving public employers) can file suit for a
complainant in a Title VII action, whereas only a private citizen can initiate a § 1981 action.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).
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contravene Title VII's express mandate that its administrative
machinery be used to settle and conciliate claims to avoid unneces-
sary litigation." Despite this possibility, the McDonald Court never
addressed this issue. The lower courts, however, have taken some
measures to curb what they perceive to be an undermining of this
preferred administrative remedy. Thus, although a plaintiff need
not exhaust his Title VII remedy before proceeding into federal
court on his section 1981 claim,59 a court may stay the 1981 proceed-
ings pending disposition by the EEOC of the Title VII charges. 0
Other courts have allowed the EEOC to intervene during the pen-
dency of a section 1981 suit.' Especially in light of McDonald's
expansion of section 1981's coverage to include white litigants, the
Supreme Court may soon be forced to articulate its views on the
proper relationship between these two statutes, thereby resolving
this important question of federal law.
Despite Justice Marshall's statement that the Court was not con-
sidering the permissibility of affirmative action programs,"
McDonald may add more uncertainty to the sensitive issue of re-
verse discrimination. A broad reading of McDonald and its con-
struction of section 1981 may suggest that all preferential treatment
favoring minorities at the expense of whites constitutes discrimina-
tion impermissible under that section. Indeed, the Court's position
that section 1981 was intended to proscribe discrimination against,
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970). See notes 2 & 3 supra. Under Title VII, it is only when
conciliation is unsuccessful that the complainant can resort to litigation. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
See generally Selecting a Remedy, supra note 47, at 313.
59. See, e.g., Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 916 (1971), where the plaintiff intentionally bypassed his Title VII remedy through
the EEOC and proceeded directly into federal court on his § 1981 claim. The court held that
the two remedies were coextensive and independent of each other; thus exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies was not necessary for relief under § 1981.
60. See, e.g., Stringer v. Nosef, 388 F. Supp. 1389, 1390 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (recognizing
the propriety of a discretionary stay of § 1981 actions until conciliation efforts of the EEOC
have had a chance to succeed).
61. See Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 916 (1971) (district court can stay § 1981 relief and in the proper case, the EEOC
can intervene). One circuit court has expressed this view on a proper accommodation of the
two federal statutes: "By fashioning equitable relief with due regard to the availability of
conciliation and by encouraging in appropriate cases a resort to the EEOC during the pen-
dency of § 1981 cases, the courts will carry out the policies of both statutes." Young v.
International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757, 764 (3d Cir. 1971).
62. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
Vol. 15: 495
1977 Recent Decisions
or in favor of, any race 3 is difficult to reconcile with the imposition
of hiring quotas which necessarily exclude whites from employment
opportunities. Yet such quotas, as one form of affirmative action,
have frequently been used by lower courts to remedy the effects of
past discrimination in employment." The Supreme Court has until
recently declined to decide the constitutionality of such color-
conscious remedies. 5 Since McDonald did not involve benign dis-
crimination,6" but rather the bare allegation of preferential treat-
ment of a black employee over two white employees, to interpret the
decision as a ban on such forms of affirmative action relief is proba-
bly unwarranted. There are indications, however, that McDonald is
already having some impact on the intractable affirmative ac-
tion/reverse discrimination problem. 7
In McDonald, the Court broadened the scope of Title VII and
63. See 427 U.S. at 295, where the Court stated: "[T]he Act was meant ... to proscribe
discrimination . . . against, or in favor of, any race."
64. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 854 (1971) (Philadelphia Plan which ordered construction industry to initiate affirm-
ative action plans including specific goals for minority hiring of 20% to 24%). But see Pennsyl-
vania v. Glickman, 370 F. Supp. 724 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (hiring quotas on city of Pittsburgh
fire department rejected despite a finding of discriminatory hiring practices). See generally
Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REv. 955 (1974);
Comment, Carter v. Gallagher: From Benign Classification to Reverse Discrimination, 34 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 130 (1972).
65. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (issue of whether preferential admis-
sions policy discriminated against white applicant to state-related law school held moot since
petitioner had entered law school and would soon graduate). The Supreme Court has recently
agreed to decide the issue of the constitutionality of reverse discrimination in Bakke v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert.
granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-811).
66. The problems and complexities of affirmative action programs, particularly where
such programs take the form of benign discrimination, are beyond the scope of this note. For
an interesting debate on these issues, compare Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitu-
tionality of Preferential Treatment o Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1, with Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723 (1974).
67. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr.
680 (1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-811). Relying in part
on McDonald as a signal of the Supreme Court's reluctance to apply different standards to
determine the rights of minorities and members of the majority, the California Supreme
Court in Bakke invalidated a medical school admissions program which gave preferential
treatment to minority applicants. But cf. Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326,
348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976), where the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of preferential admissions policies utilized by a state-funded medical school
despite claims of reverse discrimination. See also Selecting a Remedy, supra note 47, at 323
(asserting that the statute may be used to challenge judicially imposed affirmative action
programs).
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section 1981 to bring whites within the class of persons protected
against racial discrimination in employment. In light of the all-
inclusive language of these civil rights statutes, and the anomaly
that would result from a construction of anti-discrimination stat-
utes so that only a select group would benefit from their provisions,
it is difficult to argue with the Court's decision. However, the
Court's silence on the relationship between the two statutes raises
troubling questions concerning the use of section 1981 to circumvent
Title VII's preferred administrative machinery. Moreover, the case
at least raises the possibility that section 1981 may proscribe affirm-
ative action programs which accord minorities preferential treat-
ment in order to remedy the effects of past discrimination. These
lingering issues raised by the McDonald decision will probably re-
quire the Court to return to the sensitive area of employment dis-
crimination in the near future.
Larry A. Silverman
